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NOTES
Criminal Law-Cooper v. United States-Constitutional
Recognition for Defendant's Plea Bargaining Expectations
in the Absence of Detrimental Reliance
Plea bargaining has long been regarded as the illegitimate child of
the American criminal justice system-rarely exposed to public view

but tolerated, nevertheless, as an essential member of the family.1 In its
landmark 1971 decision in Santobello v. New York, 2 the United States

Supreme Court for the first time recognized the right of a criminal defendant to remedial relief when the government breaches its plea bar-

gain obligation after the defendant has pled guilty? The constitutional
basis for that decision, however, has remained an open question, and

most courts, relying on analogies to contract law, have required the
entry of a guilty plea or some other form of detrimental reliance by the
defendant as a prerequisite to relief from a breached plea agreement.4
In Cooper v. UnitedStates,5 however, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit explicitly rejected any requirement of det-

rimental reliance and held that a defendant's right to enforcement of a
breached plea arrangement may arise "on the basis alone of expecta-

tions reasonably formed in reliance upon the honor of the government
in making and abiding by its proposals." 6 Construing Santobelo as

promulgating a constitutional right of a defendant to be treated with
1. In Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971), the Supreme Court approved of the
practice of plea bargaining as "an essential component of the administration of justice." Id. at
260. For many years plea bargaining was "shrouded in secrecy and deliberately concealed by
participating defendants, defense lawyers, prosecutors, and even judges." Blackledge v. Allison,
431 U.S. 63, 76 (1977). Critical to plea bargaining is the concept of reciprocal benefits. See, e.g.,
People v. Collins, 21 Cal. 3d 208, 577 P.2d 1026, 145 Cal. Rptr. 686 (1978). Among these benefits
are that a
defendant avoids extended pretrial incarceration and the anxieties and uncertainties of a
trial; he gains a speedy disposition of his case, the chance to acknowledge his guilt, and a
prompt start inrealizing whatever potential there may be for rehabilitation. Judges and
prosecutors conserve vital and scarce resources. The public is protected from the risks
posed by those charged with criminal offenses who are at large on bail while awaiting
completion of criminal proceedings.
Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. at 71.
2. 404 U.S. 257 (1971).
3. Id. at 262.
4. See notes 39-69 and accompanying text infra.
5. 594 F.2d 12 (4th Cir. 1979).
6. Id. at 18; see text accompanying notes 22-26 infra.

NORTH CAROLINA L4WREVIEW

[Vol. 58

"fairness" throughout the plea negotiation process,7 the Cooper court
grounded its enforcement of a withdrawn plea proposal upon a defendant's substantive due process right to "fundamental fairness" 8 and, less
directly, upon the right to effective assistance of counsel. 9
Defendant Cooper was arrested by federal authorities and charged
with two counts each of bribery of a witness' and obstruction of justice.I' The criminal charges stemmed from Cooper's offer to leave the
United States in return for a $10,000 payment from the defendant
against whom Cooper was to testify in a narcotics trial.' 2 Shortly after
Cooper's arrest, at approximately 11:00 A.M. on May 11, 1977,
Cooper's defense counsel met with an Assistant United States Attorney
to discuss a possible plea bargain agreement. '3 After some initial negotiations, the Assistant United States Attorney proposed an agreement
under which Cooper was to plead guilty to one count of obstruction of
justice, remain in jail and testify on three occasions in upcoming narcotics trials.' 4 In return, the prosecutor agreed to dismiss all other
counts of the indictment and to bring Cooper's cooperation to the sentencing judge's attention. 5 Cooper's attorney immediately communi7. 594 F.2d at 16; see text accompanying notes 121-26 infra.
8. 594 F.2d at 18;see text accompanying notes 127-51 infra.
9. 594 F.2d at 18;see text accompanying notes 153-69 infra.
10. 594 F.2d at 13; see 18 U.S.C. § 201(e) (1976).
11. 594 F.2d at 13; see 18 U.S.C. § 1503 (1976).
12. 594 F.2d at 13-14. To avoid prosecution in Maryland on narcotics charges, defendant
Cooper had earlier agreed to cooperate with the Federal Drug Enforcement Administration
(DEA) as an undercover informer. Cooper's activities led to indictments being issued against
several persons, including one Simpson, on narcotics charges. Cooper was moved from Maryland
to Little Rock, Arkansas as part of the Witness Protection Program of the federal government.
After a time, Cooper was to return to Maryland to testify for the government against those whose
indictments he had helped secure. In a telephone call to Simpson on May 5, 1977, Cooper offered
to flee to Mexico, thereby removing himself as a witness, in return for a $10,000 payment by
Simpson. Simpson contacted his attorney who immediately went to Simpson's residence to monitor a second call from Cooper later that day. Simpson had been noncommittal in the first call and
remained so in the second, but arrangements were made for a third call on May 6. Simpson and
his attorney informed the United States Attorney for the District of Maryland and DEA agents of
these contacts with Cooper. The third call was monitored and recorded by federal authorities with
Simpson's permission. In return for Simpson's cooperation, it was agreed that no statements made
by him during the recorded third call would be used against him in his upcoming trial. Id. at 14.
13. Id. at 15. Cooper could not be present at this meeting because he was then being held in
jail awaiting trial.
14. Id. at 15. Cooper was also to be removed from the Witness Protection Program. See
note 12 supra.
15. 594 F.2d at 15. Cooper's appellate counsel stated that the prosecutor had represented
that the proposal would be held open for acceptance for one week. The court found a substantial
concession of this point by the government in the record. Id. at 15 n.2.
It is useful to categorize the various forms that plea bargaining agreements may take. Two
basic categories---"charge bargaining" and "sentence negotiation"-will suffice. See, e.g., Wiley
v. Commonwealth, 575 S.W.2d 166 (Ky. 1978); Beall, PrinciesoffPlea Bargaining,9 Loy. CHI.
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cated this proposal to Cooper, who decided to accept its terms. At

approximately 12:00 noon that same day, Cooper's defense counsel began telephoning the prosecutor to notify him of Cooper's acceptance.
Before Cooper's attorney could communicate Cooper's acceptance,
however, the prosecutor met with his superior, who ordered that the

plea proposal be withdrawn. When Cooper's attorney finally reached
the prosecutor by telephone between 2:30 and 3:30 P.M. that afternoon,

the prosecutor told Cooper's attorney that the proposal had been withL.J. 175 (1977). Charge bargaining connotes the defendant's tendering of a guilty plea in return
for the prosecutor's commitment to reduce a charge from that originally filed, see, e.g., State v.
Wayne, 245 S.E.2d 838 (W.Va. 1978); dismiss other filed or pending charges, see, e.g., United
States v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 551 F.2d 1106 (8th Cir. 1977); or not bring additional
charges, see, e.g., People v. Collins, 21 Cal. 3d 208, 577 P.2d 1026, 145 Cal. Rptr. 686 (1978).
Variations of a charge bargain occur when a prosecutor purports to bind a different district to the
agreement, see, e.g., United States v. Carter, 454 F.2d 426 (4th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 417 U.S.
933 (1974); a state prosecutor purports to bind a state liquor licensing authority, see, e.g., Chaipis
v. State Liquor Auth., 44 N.Y.2d 57, 375 N.E.2d 32, 404 N.Y.S.2d 76 (1978); or a prosecutor
agrees to dismiss or reduce charges against another person, see, e.g., People v. Walker, 75 Mich.
App. 552, 255 N.W.2d 658 (1977).
Sentence negotiation generally involves a defendant's agreement to plead guilty if the prosecutor will recommend a certain term of years imprisonment to the trial judge, see, e.g., Correale v.
United States, 479 F.2d 944 (1st Cir. 1973); stand silent at the sentencing hearing, see, e.g.,
Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971); recommend probation, see, e.g., In re Palodichuk,
22 Wash. App. 107, 589 P.2d 269 (1978); not oppose probation, see, e.g., United States v. Ewing,
480 F.2d 1141 (5th Cir. 1973); recommend parole after a certain period of time, see, e.g., Palermo
v. Warden, Green Haven State Prison, 545 F.2d 286 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 911
(1977); have a particular judge preside over sentencing, see People v. Preciado, 78 Cal. App. 3d
144, 144 Cal. Rptr. 102 (1978); bring mitigating factors to the court's attention, see, e.g., United
States v. Bowler, 585 F.2d 851 (7th Cir. 1978); postpone the time of sentencing until all possible
indictments are charged, see United States v. Thomas, 580 F.2d, 1036 (10th Cir. 1978), cert. denied,439 U.S. 1130 (1979); have sentences run concurrently rather than consecutively, see, e.g., In
re Williams, 21 Wash. App. 238, 583 P.2d 1262 (1978); or make a disposition other than sentencing, see, e.g., Green v. United States, 377 A.2d 1132 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
A hybrid arrangement results when the prosecutor agrees that the defendant will be imprisoned in a particular facility. See Casebeer v. United States, 531 F.2d 949 (9th Cir. 1976) (per
curiam). See also Lambert v. State, 338 So. 2d 915 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
In addition to his agreement to plead guilty, a defendant may agree to give valuable information to the police, see, e.g., United States v. Boulier, 359 F. Supp. 165 (E.D.N.Y. 1972), ajrdsub
nom. United States v. Nathan, 476 F.2d 456 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 823 (1973); testify
against a third person, see, e.g., State v. Neitte, 363 So. 2d 425 (La. 1978); not testify in favor of
another, see, e.g., Franklin v. State, 577 P.2d 860 (Nev. 1978) (against public policy); submit to a
lie detector test, see, e.g., United States v. Bursten, 560 F.2d 779 (7th Cir. 1977); make restitution
of embezzled funds, see, e.g., State v. McIntyre, 33 N.C. App. 557, 235 S.E.2d 920 (1977); waive a
preliminary hearing, see, e.g., Courtnoy v. State, 341 P.2d 610 (Okla. Crim. 1959); not appeal his
conviction, see, e.g., United States v. LaVallee, 427 F.2d 328 (2d Cir. 1970) (per curiam); withdraw his appeal from conviction on other charges, see, e.g., Staton v. Warden, 175 Conn. 328, 398
A.2d 1176 (1978); or leave the state permanently, see Rutherford v. Blankenship, 468 F. Supp.
1357 (W.D. Va. 1979) (against public policy).
Of course, any particular arrangement may have elements of both charge and sentence bargaining within it. This was the situation in Cooper, in which the prosecutor offered a charge
bargain, dismissal of three counts leaving one standing, and a sentence recommendation, bringing
defendant's cooperation to the sentencing judge's attention.
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drawn.16 Cooper's defense attorney unsuccessfully protested this action
to the prosecutor, the United States Attorney and the United States
District Court for the District of Maryland.' 7
After conviction at trial on all counts, Cooper took an appeal to
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in which he
asserted three errors, two of which were quickly disposed of as being

without merit. 8 In his third assignment of error Cooper argued that
the terms of the government's plea proposal ought to have been and
now should be specifically enforced. The court of appeals agreed with

this contention, finding enforcement essential to vindicate the government's violation, by its unilateral withdrawal of the plea proposal, of

Cooper's constitutional rights to "fairness"' 19 and effective assistance of

counsel.2" The Cooper court specifically premised its holding on its
factual findings that the government's plea proposal had been specific

and unambiguous, made without reservations, reasonable in context,
made by a prosecutor with apparent or actual authority, promptly communicated to and immediately sought to be accepted by defendant, and

withdrawn not on the basis of extenuating circumstances but rather on
of "a superior's second-guessing of a subordinate's judgthe basis
21
ment."

In finding a violation of Cooper's constitutional rights, the court of
16. 594 F.2d at 15.
17. At a pre-trial hearing, the district court denied Cooper's motion to compel enforcement
of the plea proposal. Id.
18. Cooper first argued that the recorded conversation with Simpson on May 6 was inadmissible. See note 12 supra. The rule is that consent of one party to a wire communication makes
interception lawful. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(0) (1976). Cooper did not contest the giving of consent
but instead challenged the voluntariness of that consent. The court rejected Cooper's contention
that Simpson's consent was coerced by a grant of immunity, citing United States v. Dowdy, 479
F.2d. 213, 229 (4th Cir. 1973), which had rejected the same contention. Moreover, the court indicated that the record did not support Cooper's contentions that Simpson's will had been overborne
by his attorney's influence and that Simpson's consent had not been intelligently given. 594 F.2d
at 14.
Cooper's second asserted error was that Simpson's attorney should have been sequestered as
a witness, under Rule 615 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, during Simpson's testimony about the
May 5 telephone conversations, particularly the second call that Simpson's attorney had overheard. See note 12 supra. Cooper argued that the May 5 conversations were critical to proof of
solicitation of a bribe because of ambiguities in the recorded May 6 conversation. Despite recognition that exclusion is ordinarily a matter of right, the court, citing L.S. Ayres & Co. v. NLRB,
551 F.2d 586, 588 (4th Cir. 1977), found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to
sequester Simpson's attorney. The court stated that Simpson's attorney fell within an exception to
Rule 615 as a person whose presence was necessary to protect Simpson's need for counsel during
his testimony. 594 F.2d at 14-15.
19. 594 F.2d at 18; see text accompanying notes 70-95 infra.
20. 594 F.2d at 18; see text accompanying notes 108-20 infra.
21. 594 F.2d at 19.
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appeals expressly rejected the need for a guilty plea to support remedial
relief.2 2 The court also rejected analogies to substantive and remedial
contract principles, often utilized by courts to define appropriate relief,23 as too narrow to define the limits of the constitutional right of a
defendant to be treated with "fairness" throughout the plea negotiation
process. 24 In so holding, the Cooper court adopted the view that a defendant's expectations of a proposal's fulfillment are constitutionally
entitled to protection 25 "under appropriate circumstances . . before
any technical 'contract' has been formed."2 6
To remedy the constitutional violations found in Cooper, the court
22. Id. at 16. The law surrounding remedial relief for defendants who are aggrieved by
prosecutorial breach of a plea agreement is exhaustively analyzed in Westen & Westin, A Constitutional Law of Remediesfor Broken PleaBargains,66 CALIF. L. REv. 471 (1978). See also Note,
The Legitimation ofPlea Bargaining: RemediesforBroken Promises, 11 AMER. CrIuM. L. REV. 771
(1973).
23. See text accompanying notes 34-54 infra.
24. 594 F.2d at 16-18. It is interesting to note that Cooper may have created a conflict with
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which stated, albeit in dictum, that mere
expectation would not support enforcement of a plea agreement. See Johnson v. Beto, 466 F.2d
478 (5th Cir. 1972). Said the Fifth Circuit in Beto:
Plea bargaining is an accepted folkway of our criminal jurisprudence onto which some,
but not all, contract criteria have been superimposed. Analogous to promissory estoppel,
plea bargaining must have more substantiality than mere expectation and hope. It must
have explicit expression and reliance and is measured by objective, not subjective, standards.
Id. at 480. The Fifth Circuit recently reaffirmed the Beto approach in In re Geisser, 554 F.2d
698 (5th Cir. 1977), in which the court viewed plea bargaining as contractual in nature, with
enforcement dependent upon detrimental reliance on the agreement by the defendant.
25. "[A] constitutional right to enforcement of plea proposals may arise . . . on the basis
alone of expectations reasonably formed in reliance upon the honor of the government in making
and abiding by its proposals." 594 F.2d at 18. This constitutional protection for a defendant's
expectations, said the Cooper court, flows from the recognition that courts have implicitly protected a defendant's expectations through directing enforcement of breached plea agreements. Id.
at 16-18, 18 n.8. The court drew heavily upon the premise advanced by Westen and Westin that
the ordering of specific enforcement of breached plea agreements in earlier cases could be explained only if the right protected extends from the expectations of a defendant that his bargained
for benefits will be secured to him through the fulfillment of a proposal. Id. at 18 n.8; see Westen
& Westin, supranote 22, at 512-28. Westen and Westin apparently recognized, however, that such
expectations had been supported by the defendant's guilty plea or some other act done in reliance
upon the agreement. Id. at 524-28. In Cooper, neither a guilty plea nor any other form of detrimental reliance was present.
26. 594 F.2d at 18. To justify this extension, the court cited the holding of the United States
Supreme Court in Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977). 594 F.2d at 17 n.7. In Brewer, defense counsel and the police agreed that the defendant would not be interrogated while being
transported in the absence of counsel. In fact, while being transported, the defendant was
prompted to disclose incriminating information. The Supreme Court held that the defendant had
been improperly interrogated without waiving his right to the presence of counsel. The state
sought to distinguish this protection for the defendant on the ground that the agreement not to
interrogate was not enforceable. In response to the state's argument, the Supreme Court said,
"[W]e deal here not with notions of offer, acceptance, consideration, or other concepts of the law
of contracts. We deal with constitutional law." 430 U.S. at 401 n.8.
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of appeals directed the district court to accept2 7 and specifically enforce

the plea proposal by allowing Cooper to plead guilty to one count of
obstruction of justice in return for dismissal of the remaining three
counts. 28 Because Cooper could no longer fulfill certain terms of the
plea proposal, the court stated that the government would be relieved
of any sentence recommendation obligations.2 9
Although plea bargaining has been widely accepted as a necessary

evil in an overburdened judicial system,30 its constitutional integrity
was not recognized by the United States Supreme Court until its 1970
decision in Brady v. United States.3 1 One year later, in Santobello

.

New York, this recognition was reinforced when the Supreme Court
ordered the enforcement of a state prosecutor's agreement to stand silent at a defendant's sentencing hearing after defendant had entered a
guilty plea.32 Both before and after Santobello, however, courts have
recognized the right of a defendant to remedial relief when a prosecutor has breached a plea agreement. 3 The contractual concepts of offer,
27. Under FED. R. CRIM. P. ll(e)(2), the district court ordinarily has discretion to accept or
reject a plea agreement. See, e.g., In re Yielding, 599 F.2d 251 (8th Cir. 1979) (judge may refuse
to consider any plea agreement); United States v. Stamey, 569 F.2d 805 (4th Cir. 1979). See also
United States v. Griffin, 462 F. Supp. 928 (E.D. Ark. 1978). The Cooper court did not view this
condition precedent to all plea agreements as prohibiting a direction that this proposal be enforced. 594 F.2d at 20; accord,United States v. Lieber, 473 F. Supp. 884 (E.D.N.Y. 1979) (defendant suffered prejudice). Contrary state authority views this requirement of'judicial acceptance as
crucial to denial of enforcement in situations similar to that presented in Cooper. See text accompanying notes 55-69 infra.
28. 594 F.2d at 21.
29. Id. Presumably, Cooper did not testify for the government at the narcotics trials as had
been proposed. See text accompanying note 14 supra. Therefore, there could be no cooperation
to bring to the sentencing judge's attention. See text accompanying note 15 supra.
30. It has been estimated that nontrial adjudication, largely the result of plea bargaining,
accounts for the disposition of more than 90% of all criminal cases, D. NEWMAN, CONVICTION:
THE DETERMINATION-OF GUILT OR INNOCENCE WITHOUT TRIAL 3 (1966), and the Supreme
Court has remarked that "[properly administered, [plea bargaining] is to be encouraged,"
Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. at 262. See also Note, supra note 22.
31. 397 U.S. 742 (1970).
32. 404 U.S. at 262. Defendant in Santobello had agreed to enter a guilty plea in return for
the prosecutor's promise to make no sentencing recommendation. While defendant performed his
part of the agreement, the prosecutor inadvertently failed to do so. A prosecutor other than the
one with whom the defendant had made the agreement recommended the maximum sentence.
The Supreme Court held this to be a breach of the agreement and declared that the "interests of
justice and appropriate recognition of the duties of the prosecution" required enforcement of the
agreement, through resentencing before a different judge or vacatur of the defendant's guilty plea
at the discretion of the state appellate court. Id. at 262-63. On remand, specific performance was
ordered even though the defendant had requested vacatur. People v. Santobello, 39 A.D.2d 654,
331 N.Y.S.2d 776 (1972). This occurred despite Justice Douglas' admonition that the defendant's
preference ought to be given "considerable, if not controlling, weight." Santobello v. New York,
404 U.S. 257, 267 (Douglas, J., concurring).
33. See generallyWesten & Westin, supra note 22; Note, supra note 22; Annot., 43 A.L.R.3d
281 (1972); Annot., 66 A.L.R. 3d 902 (1975).
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acceptance, consideration and performance have provided useful analogies to courts reviewing prosecutorial breach of plea agreements.3 4
Courts generally will not enforce a breached plea agreement unless an
agreement has been entered into,3 5 the defendant has fulfilled his part
of the agreement 36 and the prosecution has failed to perform its obligations under the agreement.3 7 Courts will, however, enforce a breached
plea agreement when a defendant can properly invoke principles of
promissory estoppel or detrimental reliance.3 8
Promissory estoppel applies when the prosecutor fails to perform
his obligations under the plea agreement after the defendant has entered a guilty plea or performed some other act of detriment to himself 39 or benefit to the prosecution 4° in reliance upon the agreement,
and the injustice resulting from this detrimental reliance can be
avoided only through enforcement of the agreement. 4 ' When the prosecutor breaches the plea agreement upon which the defendant has detrimentally relied, the prosecutor secures benefits to the government
34. See, e.g., Cooper v. United States, 594 F.2d 12, 15-17 (4th Cir. 1979); Westen & Westin,
supra note 22, at 528-39; Note, supra note 22.
35. See, eg., United States v. Hammerman, 528 F.2d 326 (4th Cir. 1975); United States v.
Battle, 467 F.2d 569 (5th Cir. 1972) (no enforceable bargain arising from prosecutor's promises of
leniency).
36. See, e.g., United States v. Simmons, 537 F.2d 1260 (4th Cir. 1976) (government's obligation arises only after defendant has fully disclosed promised information). See also United States
v. Boulier, 359 F. Supp. 165 (1972), afl'dsub noma. United States v. Nathan, 476 F.2d 456 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 823 (1973) (defendant who refused to disclose promised information in no
position to protest prosecutor's nonperformance).
37. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 500 F.2d 375 (4th Cir. 1974) (defendant entitled to
resentencing when prosecutor's sentence recommendation only "half-hearted"); United States v.
Carter, 454 F.2d 426 (4th Cir. 1972) (enforcement ordered even though prosecutor's promise not
legally fulfillable at time made).
38. See, e.g., State v. Mustain, 32 Or. App. 339, 574 P.2d 674 (1978) (prosecutor's promise to
dismiss charges if proceedings in another state ended in conviction not enforced because defendant failed to prove sufficient reliance to invoke promissory estoppel); Stat6 v. Wayne, 245 S.E.2d
838, 840 (,V.Va. 1978) (specific performance of breached agreement unavailable unless reliance
demonstrated and defendant cannot be restored to position held prior to agreement). See authorities cited note 55 infra. See generally Westen & Westin, supra note 22, at 512-38; Note, supra note
22, at 783-85.
39. See, e.g., People v. Carter, 73 Misc. 2d 1040, 343 N.Y.S.2d 431, af'd,41 A.D.2d 905, 343
N.Y.S.2d 580 (1973) (agreement not enforced when defendant suffered no prejudice through detrimental reliance and guilty plea not entered).
40. See, e.g., United States v. Rodman, 519 F.2d 1058 (1st Cir. 1975) (giving information to
government); State v. Kuchenreuther, 218 N.W.2d 621 (Iowa 1974) (giving testimony and making
restitution); Workman v. Commonwealth, 580 S.W.2d 206 (Ky. 1979) (taking lie detector test,
which defendant passed).
41. See authorities cited note 38 supra. See generally J. MURRAY, CONTRACTS §§ 91-93 (2d
rev. ed. 1974); Henderson, PromissoryEstoppel and TraditionalContractDoctrine, 78 YALE L.J.
343 (1969).
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without giving the defendant his expected benefits in return.4 2 This in-

equity is particularly apparent when the prosecutor breaches an agreement after the defendant, by entering a guilty plea, has waived his

constitutional rights to a jury trial, to confront his accusers, to present
witnesses in his defense and to be convicted by proof beyond a reasonable doubt.43 In such a situation, the doctrine of promissory estoppel is
utilized to ensure that a defendant's expectations are effectuated by enforcing the agreement.' Although entry of a guilty plea is the most
common form of detrimental reliance supporting the application of
promissory estoppel, courts have granted relief on the basis of conduct
constituting detrimental reliance prior to the entry of a guilty plea.45
Providing information to government authorities,46 testifying for the
government, 47 confessing guilt, 48 returning stolen property, 49 making
monetary restitution,5 ° failing to file a motion to have charges
presented to a grand jury,5' submitting to a lie detector test 5 2 and waiv42. See, e.g., People v. Collins, 21 Cal. 3d 208, 577 P.2d 1026, 145 Cal. Rptr. 686 (1978). See
also note 15 supra.
43. See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 264 (1971) (Douglas, J., concurring). Moreover, a guilty plea is an admission of guilt as well as the basis for a judgment of conviction. See,
e.g., Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970). For these reasons, numerous protections have
arisen to safeguard the voluntariness and accuracy of a guilty plea. See generally Barkai, Accuracy
Inquriesrforall Felony andMisdemeanorFleas Voluntary PleasBut InnocentDefendants?, 126 U.
PA. L. REv. 88 (1977). This concern for defendants who enter a plea of guilty may itself explain
awards of remedial relief for prosecutorially breached plea agreements. See Westen & Westin,
supra note 22, at 512.
44. See, e.g., Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971) (remedy ensures defendant what
is "reasonably due" under the circumstances); United States v. Carter, 454 F.2d 426 (4th Cir.
1972) (enforcement ordered even when defendant detrimentally relied on legally unfulfillable
promise). See also authorities cited in Westen & Westin, supra note 22, at 536-37 n.239. An
alternative to enforcement of the agreement is to allow vacatur of defendant's guilty plea on the
ground that it was involuntarily made. See, e.g., People v. Dothit, 51 I. App. 3d 758, 366 N.E.2d
955 (1977). See generally Westen & Westin, supra note 22, at 477-511.
45. See, e.g., United States v. Rodman, 519 F.2d 1058 (Ist Cir. 1975); United States v. Lieber,
473 F. Supp. 884, 894 (E.D.N.Y. 1979); State v. Brockman, 277 Md. 687, 357 A.2d 376 (1976).
46. See, e.g., United States v. Rodman, 519 F.2d 1058 (1st Cir. 1975); Chiapis v. State Liquor
Auth., 44 N.Y.2d 57, 375 N.E.2d 32, 404 N.Y.S.2d 76 (1978).
47. See, e.g., State v. Kuchenreuther, 218 N.W.2d 621 (Iowa 1974); State v. Brockman, 277
Md. 687, 357 A.2d 376 (1976); Chiapis v. State Liquor Auth., 44 N.Y.2d 57, 375 N.E.2d 32, 404
N.Y.S.2d 76 (1978) (liquor licensing board must give strong consideration to defendant's agreement with prosecutors that liquor license would not be revoked). But see People v. Tobler, 91
Misc. 2d 69, 397 N.Y.S.2d 325 (1977) (no prejudice because defendant's testimony not used
against him).
48. See, e.g., United States v. Lieber, 473 F. Supp. 884 (E.D.N.Y. 1979) (affidavits of admission and facts to support guilty plea); State v. Brockman, 277 Md. 687, 357 A.2d 376 (1976) (selfincriminatory testimony); State v. Hoopes, 534 S.W.2d 26 (Mo. 1976) (signing affidavit of facts to
support entry of guilty plea).
49. See, e.g., Palermo v. Warden, Green Haven State Prison, 545 F.2d 286 (2d Cir. 1976),
cert. dismissed, 431 U.S. 911 (1977).
50. See, e.g., State v. Kuchenreuther, 218 N.W.2d 621 (Iowa 1974).
51. See, e.g., Mooney v. Cahn, 79 Misc. 2d 703, 361 N.Y.S.2d 118 (1974).
52. See, e.g., State v. Davis, 188 So. 2d 24 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 194 So. 2d 621
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ing certain procedural guarantees53 have all been held to constitute acts
made in detrimental reliance upon a prosecutor's breached promises.
Detrimental reliance prior to entry of a guilty plea will not, however,
require enforcement if the prosecutor did not breach the agreement,
but the court, in its discretion, refused to accept the bargain. 4
Several state jurisdictions considering situations similar to that
presented in Cooper, in which defendant had not detrimentally relied
on the plea proposal prior to withdrawal by the prosecutor, have uniformly rendered decisions contrary to the Fourth Circuit's holding."
Perhaps closest on the facts is People v. Heiler,56 in which the Michigan
Court of Appeals held judicial acceptance of a plea agreement or some
form of detrimental reliance by the defendant to be an essential prerequisite to enforcement of a plea agreement. 7 In Heiler, an assistant
prosecuting attorney proposed to reduce the charge against defendant
(Fla. 1966); People v. Reagan, 395 Mich. 306, 235 N.W.2d 581 (1975). But see People v. Martin,
38 Il. App. 3d 209, 347 N.E.2d 200 (1976). In these lie detector cases the prosecutor attempted to
withdraw from the agreement after results of the tests proved favorable to the defendant. In a
recent case, Workman v. Commonwealth, 580 S.W.2d 206 (Ky. 1979), the prosecutor refused to
drop charges, as agreed, after defendant obtained favorable results on two independent tests. On
appeal, the Kentucky Supreme Court held that concepts of fair play and substantial justice required dismissal of the charges against the defendant. Id. at 207.
53. See, e.g., Courtney v. State, 341 P.2d 610 (Okla. Crim. App. 1959) (preliminary hearing).
But see People v. Carter, 73 Misc. 2d 1040, 343 N.Y.S.2d 431, a'd,41 A.D.2d 905, 343 N.Y.S.2d
580 (1973) (waiver of preliminary hearing not sufficiently meaningful to cause prejudice). See
also United States v. Thalman, 457 F. Supp. 307 (E.D. Wis. 1978) (loss of speedy trial not prejudicial under circumstances).
It has been held that the "economic and emotional adversities" and "adverse publicity" suffered by a defendant would not constitute sufficient detriment. Id. at 310.
54. See, e.g., United States v. Bean, 564 F.2d 700, 704-05 (5th Cir. 1977).
55. Parham v. State, 555 S.W.2d 943 (Ark. 1977); Shields v. State, 374 A.2d 816 (Del. Super.),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 893 (1977); State v. Reasbeck, 359 So. 2d 564 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978);
Bullock v. State, 397 N.E.2d 310 (Ind. App. 1979); State v. Edwards, 279 N.W.2d 9 (Iowa
1979) (expressly rejecting Cooper); People v. Heiler, 79 Mich. App. 714, 262 N.W.2d 890 (1977);
People v. Carter, 73 Misc. 2d 1040, 343 N.Y.S.2d 431 (1973); State v. Collins, 44 N.C. App. 141,
260 S.E.2d 650 (1979) (expressly rejecting Cooper); State v. Mustain, 32 Or. App. 339, 574 P.2d
674 (1978); DeRusse v. State, 579 S.W.2d 224, 236 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979); State v. McClure, 242
S.E.2d 704 ("W. Va. 1978); cf. People v. Tobler, 91 Misc. 2d 69, 397 N.Y.S.2d 325 (1977) (defendant not prejudiced when prosecutor unilaterally determined that defendant's cooperation not sufficient to satisfy agreement).
56. 79 Mich. App. 714, 262 N.W.2d 890 (1977).
57. Id. at 719-20, 262 N.W.2d at 895. The court stated:
To hold the prosecutor bound by the agreement [in the absence ofjudicial acceptance or
detrimental reliance] would, we believe, actually inhibit the dispositional use of plea
bargaining by placing the prosecutor at an absolute disadvantage. This, too, violates our
fundamental sense of fair play. Absent any showing or allegation of prejudice to the
defense resulting from the prosecutor's breach of faith, we decline to permit judicial
intrusion upon the function of his office.
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in return for a guilty plea and defendant's promise to provide informa-

tion in an unrelated criminal investigation.5" After discussing the proposal with his defense counsel, defendant promptly informed the

prosecutor of his acceptance.59 Prior to formal entry of defendant's
guilty plea, however, the prosecutor's office withdrew from the agree60

ment because the proposal violated the prosecutor's charging policy.
The trial court granted defendant's motion to compel enforcement of

the agreement, believing that fairness required enforcement of the

prosecutor's withdrawn proposal.6 ' The Michigan Court of Appeals,
however, rejected the trial court's determination, holding that defend-

ant could not compel enforcement because the prosecutor could withdraw from the agreement, absent prejudice through detrimental
reliance by defendant, at any time prior to the trial court's acceptance
of the agreement.6 2 Judicial acceptance, noted the court, is a condition

precedent that underlies all plea proposals.63 Until judicial acceptance
of a plea proposal has taken place, the agreement has not come to "fruition" and, therefore, is not binding on the prosecutor. 64 Because defense counsel should be aware of the possibility of trial court rejection
of the proposed agreement, the court in Heiler reasoned that defendant
6

had no right to rely on the proposal prior to trial court approval.
In another fact situation similar to that presented in Cooper, the
Supreme Court of Delaware, in Shields v. State,6 6 mirrored the holding
58. Defendant in leiler was originally charged with armed robbery and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. The proposal was for defendant to plead guilty to the
reduced charge of attempted armed robbery and the same degree of possession of a firearm during
the commission of a felony. Id. at 716-17, 262 N.W.2d at 892.
59. Id. Defense counsel communicated defendant's acceptance to the prosecutor.
60. Id. This apparently meant little more than that the assistant prosecutor's superior disagreed with the advisability of the agreement.
61. The trial court ordered reinstatement of the plea bargain, stating that "the Prosecutor
must show more good faith and be held to a higher standard than someone who is in the ordinary
market place." Id. (citing People v. Reagan, 395 Mich. 306, 235 N.W.2d 581 (1975)).
62. Id. at 718-20, 262 N.W.2d at 894-95; accord,State v. Reasbeck, 359 So. 2d 564 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1978).
63. 79 Mich. App. at 717-19, 262 N.W.2d at 893-94. See also People v. Orin, 13 Cal. 3d 937,
942, 533 P.2d 193, 197, 120 Cal. Rptr. 65, 69 (1975) (plea bargain contemplates negotiated agreement approved by the court).
64. 79 Mich. App. at 718-19, 262 N.W.2d at 894. The Heilercourt stated, "[Sluch agreements
[lacking judicial approval or detrimental reliance] are not binding upon the prosecutor. . . any
more than they are binding upon defendants (who are always free to withdraw from plea agreements prior to entry of their guilty plea regardless of any prejudice to the prosecution that may
result from a breach)." Id. at 720, 262 N.W.2d at 895.
65. Id. at 718-20, 262 N.W.2d at 894-95. This determination rests on the principle that a trial
judge can refuse to allow dismissal, pursuant to a plea agreement, of originally filed charges. Id.
at 717-20, 262 N.W.2d at 893-94. Also involved is the rule that a trial judge need not accept a
prosecutor's sentencing recommendation. See, e.g., People v. Davis, 74 Mich. App. 624, 254
N.W.2d 335 (1977).
66. 374 A.2d 816 (Del.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 893(1977).
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of the Heiler court in refusing to enforce a plea agreement in the absence of a guilty plea or some other form of detrimental reliance on the
part of the defendant. In Shields, defendant accepted an assistant pros-

ecutor's proposal to reduce the charge against him in return for a plea
of guilty.67 Several weeks thereafter, but prior to entry of a guilty plea,

the prosecuting attorney informed defendant that the proposal was being withdrawn. Prior to trial on the original charge, defendant moved
the trial court for enforcement of the proposal, which motion the trial
court denied. On appeal from defendant's conviction at trial,68 defend-

ant argued that principles of contract law as well as the prosecutor's
breach of faith required enforcement of the plea proposal. Rejecting
these contentions, the Supreme Court of Delaware refused enforcement

and held that the prosecutor could withdraw from a plea agreement at
any time prior to, but not after, the actual entry of defendant's guilty
69
plea or other action by defendant constituting detrimental reliance.
In Cooper, however, constitutional, rather than contract, principles

were used to justify enforcement of the plea proposal. 70 The court re-

lied primarily upon the principle that a defendant's substantive due
process right to fairness7 is violated by the prosecutor's unilateral
withdrawal of the plea proposal.7 z Certain factors govern the use and
application of the due process concept, which the United States
Supreme Court, in United States v. Lovasco,73 made apparent:
Judges are not free, in defining "due process", to impose on law
enforcement officials our "personal and private notions" of fairness
and to "disregard the limits that bind judges in their judicial function." . . . Our task is more circumscribed. We are to determine
only whether the actions complained of ... violate those "fundamental conceptions of justice which lie at the base of our civil and
67. The documented offer stated that the state would dismiss the original first degree murder
charge in return for defendant's plea of guilty to charges of second degree murder and rape.
Defense counsel communicated the defendant's acceptance several days after the proposal had
been delivered by the prosecution. Id. at 818.
68. Id. at 821. Defendant received a death sentence, which was reduced on appeal to a life
sentence without benefit of parole. Id.
69. Id. at 820; accord, State v. Edwards, 279 N.W.2d 9 (Iowa 1979); State v. McClure, 242
S.E.2d 704 (W. Va. 1978). See also DeRusse v. State, 579 S.W.2d 224, 236 (Tex. Crim. App.
1979); State v. Mustain, 32 Or. App. 339, 574 P.2d 674 (1978), People v. Carter, 73 Misc. 2d 1040,
343 N.Y.S.2d 431, afifd, 41 A.D.2d 905, 343 N.Y.S.2d 580 (1973).
70. 594 F.2d at 18; see text accompanying notes 19-33 supra.
71. See, e.g., Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 494 n.6 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring)
("Due Process in essence means fundamental fairness .... .

72. 594 F.2d at 18.
73. 431 U.S. 783 (1977) (lengthy investigation delay prior to indictment of defendant did not
violate due process even though investigation substantially completed shortly after offenses occurred and defendant suffered prejudice because of delay).
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political institutions,".., and which define "the community's sense
of fair play and decency .... "274

In applying these fundamental factors to a defendant's claim of
violation of due process rights by governmental misconduct, the
Supreme Court utilizes a two-step analysis: the Court first examines
the character of the government's conduct and then determines
whether that conduct has violated a protected right of the defendant.

Only if governmental misconduct is "outrageous" will the Court find
that the character of the conduct, regardless of the existence of a pro-

tected right, is sufficient to constitute a denial of due process. An explicit illustration of this analysis is found in Hampton v. United
States," in which the Supreme Court held that the government's con-

duct in providing illegal narcotics to a defendant convicted of selling
the same narcotics to government agents did not constitute entrapment
per se because the defendant had been predisposed to engage in the
crime.7 6 Mr. Justice Rehmquist, writing for the plurality, stated:
The limitations of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment come into play only when the Government activity in question
[T]he police conviolates some protected right of the defendant....
duct here [did not deprive] defendant of any right secured to him by
the United States Constitution.7 7
The principle to be discerned from the Court's decision in Hampton is

that governmental misconduct must affect a protected right of the defendant unless the government's conduct is sufficiently "outrageous" to
be a denial of due process in itself.7 8
74.
75.
76.
that the

Id. at 790 (citations omitted).
425 U.S. 484 (1976).
Id. at 488-89 (Rehnquist, J., joined by Burger, C.J. and White, J.). Defendant asserted
informer had furnished him with the narcotics. The trial court refused an instruction

specifying that if the jury believed the informer had provided the narcotics then there would be
entrapment as a matter of law despite defendant's predisposition to commit the crime. Defendant
argued that the instruction should have been given because such conduct by the government
would be "outrageous." Id. at 488-90.
77. Id. at 490-91.
78. See, e.g., United States v. Leja, 563 F.2d 244 (6th Cir. 1977), cerl. denied, 436 U.S. 948
(1978). The government's complicity in crime substantially affects a defendant's protected right to
be free from entrapment. See, e.g., Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 372 (1958) (Congress
could not have intended that statutes be enforced through tempting innocent persons to violate the
law).
Concurring in Hampton, Mr. Justice Powell, joined by Mr. Justice Blackmun, disagreed with
the plurality's absolute rule that such official conduct would not constitute a denial of due process
whenever defendant was shown to have a predisposition to commit the crime. Powell indicated
that governmental misconduct may be sufficiently outrageous under certain circumstances to be a
denial of due process despite defendant's predisposition. 425 U.S. at 492-95. In support of this
position, Justice Powell cited Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952), in which police officials
forcibly extracted narcotics from defendant's stomach after defendant had swallowed the narcotics
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The two-step due process analysis requiring a finding of governmental misconduct and violation of a protected right was also applied
in Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 9 in which the Supreme Court held that
prosecutorial threats of indicting defendant for a substantially greater
offense if defendant did not plead guilty to the charge on which he was
originally indicted, followed by actual indictment for the greater offense because defendant did not plead guilty, did not violate defendant's due process rights because defendant had been properly
chargeable on the greater offense."0 The majority held that the prosecutor's efforts to encourage defendant to give up his right to trial, during the "give and take" of plea negotiations, were a proper exercise of
discretion"' and, therefore, constitutionally acceptable.8"
in the presence of the police. The Court held that such conduct by the police "shocks the conscience" and violates a defendant's due process rights. Rochin does not extend to nonconsensual
taking of blood samples because such conduct is considered to be only a slight intrusion upon
defendant's person. See Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432 (1957). See also Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
Mr. Justice Brennan, joined by Mr. Justice Stewart and Mr. Justice Marshall, dissenting in
Hampton, expressed the view that the police conduct in Hampton was "sufficiently offensive" to
be a denial of due process. 425 U.S. at 497.
Five Justices would, therefore, recognize a violation of due process rights, under appropriate
circumstances, based solely upon outrageous governmental conduct. See United States v. Leja,
563 F.2d 244, 246 (6th Cir. 1977).
79. 434 U.S. 357 (1977).
80. Id. at 363-65. Defendant in Bordenkircher had been indicted on a forged check charge,
an offense carrying a term of two to ten years imprisonment. The prosecutor offered to recommend a five-year term if defendant would plead guilty. At the outset of plea negotiations the
prosecutor threatened to indict defendant as an habitual criminal, an offense carrying a
mandatory life sentence, if defendant did not plead guilty to the forged check charge. Defendant
could have been properly charged with the offense because conviction on the forgery charge
would have provided the required third felony. Defendant refused to plead guilty, the prosecutor
filed the habitual criminal charge, and defendant was subsequently convicted and received the
mandatory life sentence. Id. at 358-59.
81. See text accompanying notes 96-107 infra.
82. 434 U.S. at 364-65. Mr. Justice Powell, in dissent, argued that the prosecutor's conduct
had been consciously directed at discouraging and then severely penalizing defendant's exercise of
his constitutional right to trial. Id. at 368. Therefore, said Justice Powell, such conduct was not a
constitutionally permissible exercise of discretion. Id. at 373. Mr. Justice Powell stated that the
peculiar facts of the case supported his conclusion. The more serious offense to which defendant
was subject was the habitual criminal statute that required three felony convictions before it could
be implemented. Defendant had not served a prison term for his previous two felonies. Defendant's third felony charge involved a forged check in the amount of $88.30 and was an offense
carrying a potential sentence of 2 to 10 years. The prosecutor offered to recommend a five-year
term if defendant would plead guilty. Powell observed that this "hardly could be characterized as
a generous offer." Id. at 369. The prosecutor threatened that the habitual criminal charge would
be entered should defendant decide not to plead guilty. The prosecutor conceded that the only
reason for actually charging defendant with the habitual criminal offense had been defendant's
refusal to plead guilty. By choosing to go to trial on the forgery charge defendant received a life
sentence as an habitual criminal. Powell viewed defendant's circumstances as clearly inappropriate to apply the habitual criminal statute. Id. at 370-71. Mr. Justice Blackmun, also in dissent,
argued that due process should have protected defendant from the prosecutorial vindictiveness
displayed in Bordenkircher. Id. at 367.
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Defendant in Bordenkircherfailed to prove governmental misconduct. 3 Defendant in Hampton failed to show either the violation of a
protected right by governmental misconduct or "outrageous" governmental misconduct.8 4 In both cases the substantive due process right to
fundamental fairness had been applied by the Court and found not to
provide defendant with a basis for relief. Santobello v. New York,"5
however, met both requirements of the Supreme Court's substantive
due process test. Governmental misconduct arose from the prosecutor's breach of the plea agreement.86 Violation of a protected right
arose from defendant's entry of a guilty plea, which resulted in the
waiver of a number of constitutional guarantees, 7 in reliance upon the
agreement.8 8 With both elements of its due process analysis before it,
the Court held that there was a right to remedial relief, stating that
"when a plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or agreement
of the prosecutor so that it can be said to be part of the inducement or
consideration, such promise must be fulfilled." 89
The determination of governmental misconduct under the
Supreme Court's due process analysis, however, must be made in light
of the prosecutor's discretionary control over criminal prosecutions,
which has historically been exceedingly broad. 90 The prevailing rule is
that the doctrine of separation of powers prohibits judicial interference
with the prosecutor's discretionary decision to prosecute in a particular
case. 9 ' Also within the prosecutor's discretionary power is the decision
83. The majority in Bordenkircher viewed the prosecutor's conduct as a proper exercise of
discretion. The detrimental effect of that conduct upon defendant's exercise of constitutional
rights would not, therefore, provide a basis for finding a violation of due process. See text accompanying notes 79-82 supra.
84. See text accompanying notes 75-78 supra. Five Justices in Hampton held that defendant
could not claim the benefit of his protected right to be free of entrapment because his predisposition to commit the crime had been demonstrated. Two of those five Justices rejected the absolute
rule, which would deprive a defendant of that protected right regardless of the character of the
government's conduct. Those two justices would recognize that a defendant may, under appropriate circumstances, premise a due process violation solely upon "outrageous" governmental conduct. The three dissenting justices in Hampion thought that the government's complicity in crime
had been sufficiently outrageous to be a denial of due process. See note 78 supra.
85. 404 U.S. 257 (1971); see note 30 s.upra and text accompanying notes 121-26 infra.
86. 404 U.S. at 262.
87. See text accompanying note 43 supra.
88. 404 U.S. at 262. Protections provided for defendants entering guilty pleas may substantially explain remedial relief in the situation presented by prosecutorial breach of a plea agreement. See text accompanying note 43 supra. See also Westen & Westin, supra note 22, at 512.
89. 404 U.S. at 262.
90. See, e.g., United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 171 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 935
(1965).
91. Id. See also United States v. Johnson, 577 F.2d 1304, 1307 (5th Cir. 1978).
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to engage in plea bargaining with a defendant 92 and the conduct of

negotiations once bargaining begins,9 3 within which the withdrawal of
a plea proposal, once made, would appear to fall.9 4 The prosecutor's

broad discretionary power is, however, subject to constitutional limitations.95 Examples are the equal protection prohibition against discriminatory enforcement of the law9 6 and the due process prohibitions

against prosecutorial vindictiveness in the charging decision following
a defendant's successful appeal of a conviction, 97 suppression of mate-

rial evidence favorable to a defendant,9" and intentional, prejudicial
delay in bringing a criminal indictment.9 9 In the plea bargaining con-

text, it has been held that the enforcement of a prosecutor's promise to
dismiss certain charges when the defendant has detrimentally relied on
the promise by entering a guilty plea to other charges does not infringe

on the prosecutor's discretionary powers, 00 and this holding is implicit
92. See, e.g., Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545 (1977) (prosecutor need not plea bargain if
he prefers to go to trial); Newman v. United States, 382 F.2d 479 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (not violative of
due process for prosecutor to refuse identical plea offer to equally guilty co-defendant); Brown v.
Parratt, 419 F. Supp. 44 (D. Neb. 1976), aft'd, 560 F.2d 303 (8th Cir. 1977) (plea bargaining
"unquestionably" a constitutional form of prosecutorial discretion); State v. Jackson, 223 Kan.
554, 575 P.2d 536 (1978) (prosecutor need not extend plea offer, even if one made to co-defendant).
93. See, e.g., Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1977); McMillan v. United States, 583
F.2d 1061 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 727 (1978) (no right violated by prosecutor offering codefendant a "better deal" than defendant).
94. See, e.g., People v. Heiler, 79 Mich. App. 714, 262 N.W.2d 890 (1977). See also authorities cited note 55 supra.
95. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 577 F.2d 1304, 1307 (5th Cir. 1978). See also
Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 365 (1977) ("broad though that discretion may be, there are
undoubtedly constitutional limits upon its exercise").
96. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886). See also Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448
(1962). A two-step test, requiring a showing of actual selectivity and invidious discrimination or
bad faith by the prosecutor, has been adopted in several of the United States Courts of Appeals.
See United States v. Johnson, 577 F.2d 1304, 1308 (5th Cir. 1978) (listing other United States
Courts of Appeals that have adopted the test).
97. See Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 (1974) (greater indictment raises prima facie showing of retaliatory motivation); North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969); Jackson v. Walker,
585 F.2d 139 (5th Cir. 1978) (balancing test that seeks to reconcile defendant's due process rights
with prosecutor's broad discretionary powers).
98. See, e.g., Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); Fambo v. Smith, 433 F. Supp. 590
(Wv.D.N.Y.), aft'dper curiam, 565 F.2d 233 (2d Cir. 1977) (prosecutor must disclose "clearly exculpatory" evidence during plea negotiations).
99. See United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307 (1971). See also United States v. Lovasco, 431
U.S. 783 (1977) (investigative delay proper even though defendant prejudiced somewhat by lapse
of time); United States v. Revada, 574 F.2d 1047 (5th Cir. 1978) (due process not violated unless
actual prejudice results and delay purposefully designed to feign tactical advantage or harass defendant).
100. United States v. Paiva, 294 F. Supp. 742 (D.D.C. 1969). The Fourth Circuit strongly
approved of Paiha in United States v. Carter, 454 F.2d 426 (4th Cir. 1972), cer. denied,417 U.S.
933 (1974). See also United States v. Lieber, 473 F. Supp. 884 (E.D.N.Y. 1979) (detrimental
reliance caused prejudice, separation of powers not a bar to relief).
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in the Supreme Court's decision in Santobello.'0 t

In addition to governmental misconduct, courts finding a violation
of due process have traditionally required a showing of prejudice to the
defendant."0 2 For example, the Supreme Court, in United States v.
Lovasco, 03 held that a prosecutor's delay for investigative purposes in
seeking an indictment was not sufficiently prejudicial to constitute a
violation of defendant's right to due process. The Lovasco Court noted
that prejudice is "generally a necessary but not sufficient element of a
due process claim."' 4 In Santobello, the existence of prejudice was
implicit, arising from defendant's guilty plea in reliance upon the prosecutor's breached plea bargain promise," °5 and in other cases in which
the principle of promissory estoppel has been utilized to enforce a
breached prosecutorial promise, 06 detrimental
reliance was the factor
07
defendant.'
a
to
prejudice
indicated
that
An additional constitutional consideration, the right to the effective assistance of counsel, was utilized by the Cooper court to justify
enforcement of a withdrawn plea proposal. 08 Generally, to prevail on
an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a criminal defendant must
prove that counsel's assistance either fell measurably below a standard
of reasonable competence' 0 9 or constituted a "farce or mockery" ofjustice" 0 and that such ineffective assistance prejudicially affected the
101. See text accompanying notes 30-44 supra.
102. See, e.g., Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 (1974) (vindictive reindictment on greater
charges following successful appeal); Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637 (1974) (statements
in closing argument); United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307 (1971) (lengthy pre-indictment delay);
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (suppression of material evidence favorable to the accused). See also Fambo v. Smith, 433 F. Supp. 590, 596-600 (W.D.N.Y.), aftd,565 F.2d 233 (2d
Cir. 1977) (prosecutor's failure to disclose clearly exculpatory evidence during plea negotiations
"reprehensible" but no prejudice to defendant under all the circumstances).
103. 431 U.S. 783 (1977), rehearing denied, 434 U.S. 881 (1978).
104. Id. at 790.
105. See text accompanying notes 33-44 supra. The United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit, in United States v. Carter, 454 F.2d 426 (4th Cir. 1972), expressly required
prejudice through detrimental reliance to support enforcement of a breached plea agreement. Id.
at 428. The Cooper court recognized Carterbut characterized it as involving contract analogies
that should be rejected as too narrow to define appropriate relief. 594 F.2d at 16-18. Thus, the
lack of detrimental reliance, a contract principle in the court's view, would not militate against
awarding relief to the defendant. Id. at 18.
106. See text accompanying notes 39-54 supra.
107. See, e.g., United States v. Carter, 454 F.2d 426 (4th Cir. 1972). See also authorities cited
note 55 supra.
108. 594 F.2d at 18-19.
109. See, e.g., Marzullo v. Maryland, 561 F.2d 540 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied,435 U.S. 1011
(1978). See generally Annot., 26 A.L.R. Fed. 218 (1976).
110. See, e.g., United States v. Ramirez, 535 F.2d 125 (1st Cir. 1976). See generally Annot., 26
A.L.R. Fed. 218 (1976).
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outcome of defendant's case.'I' A defendant may also prevail on an
ineffective assistance claim through a showing that he was deprived of
the intervention and advice of counsel during a critical stage in the

criminal proceedings against him without his voluntary and intelligent
waiver.1 2 During plea negotiations a defendant is entitled to the inter-

vention and advice of defense counsel, " 3 unless voluntarily and intelligently waived,"' because plea bargaining contemplates the entry of a
guilty plea." 5 Thus, defendants who have had the advice of counsel
during plea negotiations have traditionally been able to attack their

subsequent guilty pleas only by a showing that counsel's assistance was
not within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal
cases"16 or constituted a "farce or mockery" ofjustice.1' 7 Counsel's ad-

vice to enter a guilty plea pursuant to an agreement with the prosecution 188 or counsel's estimate of possible sentence, even though exceeded
after defendant enters a guilty plea,"1 9 generally have not been held to
constitute a denial of effective assistance of counsel. When defense

counsel negligently or falsely advises that a plea bargain has been negotiated when, in fact, no such agreement was made, and defendant
enters a guilty plea in reliance on the nonexistent agreement, however,

courts will generally allow defendant to withdraw his plea as involunI11.See, e.g., United States v. Decoster, No. 72-1283, slip op. at 20-1 (D.C. Cir., July 10,
1979). See also Marzullo v. Maryland, 435 U.S. 540 (1978) (White, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari) ("the federal courts of appeals are in disarray" as to the proper standard).
112. See, e.g., Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977). See generally Strazzella, Ineffective
Identiication Counsel- Cognizabillty Under the ExclusionaryRule, 48 TEMPLE L.Q. 241 (1975).
An ineffective assistance of counsel claim may also arise from a conflict of interest presented by
counsel's representation of co-defendants. See, e.g., Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 (1978).
113. See, e.g., Anderson v. North Carolina, 221 F. Supp. 930 (W.D.N.C. 1963); Davis v. State,
308 So. 2d 27 (Fla. 1975). See also Fambo v. Smith, 433 F. Supp. 590, 596-600 (W.D.N.Y.), af'd,
565 F.2d 233 (2d Cir. 1977) (prosecutor must disclose clearly exculpatory evidence during plea
negotiations so that defense counsel can render competent, informed advice). See generally
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL

JUSTICE: PLEAS OF GUILTY, Proposed Standard 14-3.1 (2d ed. tentative draft 1978) (prosecutor
may engage in plea discussions with defense counsel or defendant if counsel waived); Finer, lnefective Assistance of Counsel, 58 CORNELL L. REV. 1077 (1976).
114. See, e.g., Judge v. United States, 379 A.2d 966 (D.C. App. 1977).
115. See, e.g., Anderson v. North Carolina, 221 F. Supp. 930 (W.D.N.C. 1963). See also
Finer, supra note 113.
116. See, e.g., McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970) (guilty plea entered on the reasonably competent advice of counsel is an intelligent plea not open to attack on that ground); United
States v. Thomas, 470 F. Supp. 968 (E.D. Pa. 1979); Simmons v. State, 578 S.W.2d 12 (Ark. 1979).
117. See, e.g., Mosher v. LaVallee, 351 F. Supp. 1101 (S.D.N.Y.), afd,491 F.2d 1346 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 906 (1973).
118. See, e.g., Gilmore v. California, 364 F.2d 916 (9th Cir. 1966), af'd,419 F.2d 379 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1078 (1969); Perez v. Craven, 314 F. Supp. 867 (C.D. Cal. 1970).
119. See, e.g., United States v. Horton, 334 F.2d 153 (2d Cir. 1964).
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120
tarily made on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel.
In utilizing the substantive due process principle as a ground for
enforcement of a withdrawn plea proposal, the Cooper court derived
defendant's right to fairness, present throughout the plea negotiation
process, from the decision of the United States Supreme Court in
Santobello v. New York. 12 1 In Santobelo, the Supreme Court held that

the "interests of justice and appropriate recognition of the duties of the
prosecution" required enforcement of a plea agreement breached by
the prosecutor after the defendant fulfilled his part of the agreement by

entering a guilty plea. 22 Although the Santobello Court determined
that the "interests of justice" dictated relief, the Court did not explain
the nature of this right to relief and specified no constitutional grounds
in support of its decision. 12 3 The Court did, however, declare that sub-

stantive considerations affecting the practice of plea bargaining, "presuppose fairness in securing agreement between an accused and a
prosecutor."''

24

Moreover, said the Court, the practice of plea bargain-

ing "must be attended by safeguards to insure the defendant what is
reasonably due in the circumstances."''

25

The court of appeals in

Cooper interpreted these general statements on the need for fairness in
plea bargaining to find a right to enforcement of a plea proposal, even

though no detrimental reliance has occurred, based on the concept of
120. See, e.g., Mosher v. LaVallee, 351 F. Supp. 1101 (S.D.N.Y.), aft'd, 491 F.2d 1346 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 906 (1972). But see People v. Cowen, 68 Misc. 2d 660, 328 N.Y.S.2d
111 (1971) (court inquired, when plea entered, into defendant's understanding of possible maximum sentence; defendant denied that any promise was made to him; relief denied). Because a
guilty plea entered on the basis of reasonably competent advice of counsel is a voluntary and
intelligent plea, Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258 (1973), courts have allowed vacatur of guilty
pleas entered in reliance upon incompetent advice on the ground of involuntariness. See, e.g.,
Thurmond v. Mancusi, 275 F. Supp. 508 (E.D.N.Y. 1967).
121. 594 F.2d at 15-16. Defendant in Santobello had agreed to enter a guilty plea in return for
the prosecutor's promise to make no sentence recommendation. After defendant entered his guilty
plea, the prosecutor inadvertently breached his part of the agreement by recommending the maximum sentence.
122. 404 U.S. at 262-63; see note 30 supra.
123. Mr. Justice Douglas, however, in a concurring opinion, viewed Santobello as being
grounded in the constitutional right to due process of law because the case involved the conduct of
a state prosecutor, which is not within the Supreme Court's supervisory powers. 404 U.S. at 26667 (Douglas, J., concurring). See Westen & Westin, supra note 22, at 476. Mr. Justice Marshall,
joined by Mr. Justice Brennan and Mr. Justice Stewart, concurring in part and dissenting in part,
found a constitutional violation in the prosecutor's undercutting of the basis of defendant's waiver
of constitutional rights implicit in a guilty plea. 404 U.S. at 268 (Marshall, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part). See text accompanying note 43 supra.
124. 404 U.S. at 261. For excellent discussions of the interplay between the prosecutor, defense counsel and the accused, see Alschuler, The Defense 4ttorney's Role in Plea Bargaining,84
YALE L.J. 1179 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Defense Attorneys Role]; Alschuler, The Prosecutor's
Role in Plea Bargaining,36 UNIV. CHI. L. REv. 50 (1968); Beall, supra note 15.
125. 404 U.S. at 262.
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fairness embodied in the constitutional guarantee of due process.' 2 6
To satisfy the Supreme Court's two-step due process analysis re127
quiring governmental misconduct and violation of a protected right,
the Cooper court described defendant's protected right as the right to
be treated with fairness throughout the plea negotiation process.' 28
This merely begs the question, however, because characterizing defendant's right as one of fairness means only that there is a right to be free
from governmental misconduct. To discover the protected right necessary to due process analysis requires closer scrutiny. Defendant's protection against deprivation of liberty without due process of law,
embodied in the fifth amendment,129 could provide a sufficient protected right. In fact, it was the quantum of liberty deprivation--defendant's exposure to a greater sentence through conviction on the
original four counts in comparison to the sentence he would have received as a result of his guilty plea on one count pursuant to the plea
proposal-that apparently provided the basis for the decision in
Cooper.3 This theory, however, must be premised on the argument
that a defendant has a constitutional right to expect that his case will be
settled through a favorable plea bargain arrangement. This argument
is implicit in the Cooper court's admission that "defendant . . .had
been able to do no more than form the subjective intent to accept the
offer and experience whatever expectations of benefit had been created
by anticipation of its fulfillment"' 3 ' and in its conclusion that "a constitutional right to enforcement of plea proposals may arise . . on the
basis alone of expectations reasonably formed in reliance upon the
' 32
honor of the government in making and abiding by its proposals."'
The Cooper court's protection of plea bargain expectations without a showing of detrimental reliance directly confficts, however, with
126. 594 F.2d at 15-16. But see State v. Edwards, 279 S.W.2d 9 (Iowa 1979) (Cooper expressly
rejected because Santobello does not extend to defendant who has not detrimentally relied on plea
proposal).
127. See text accompanying notes 75-95 supra.
128. 594 F.2d at 16-17.
129. U.S. CoNsT. amend. V. ("No person shall.., be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law ....").
130. See text accompanying notes 14 & 15 supra.
131. 594 F.2d at 16.
132. Id. at 18. Recognition of a protection for defendant's expectations flows from the Cooper
court's rejection of contract law analogies as exclusive principles to support remedial relief. Id.
The facts in Cooper required this rejection because the principle of "promissory estoppel," see text
accompanying notes 39-54 supra, was unavailable because defendant had neither entered a guilty

plea nor performed any other act in detrimental reliance upon the government's plea proposal.
594 F.2d at 16. Moreover, no traditional contract had been formed because the prosecutor had
withdrawn the proposal prior to defendant's communication of acceptance. Id.
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the holding of the Supreme Court in Weatherford v. Bursey133 that defendants are not constitutionally entitled to engage in plea bargaining. 34 Apparently recognizing this difficulty, the Cooper court
distinguished Weatherford on the ground that plea negotiations in
Weatherford had not yet commenced, whereas in Cooper the prosecu-

tor had voluntarily commenced negotiations and offered a plea proposal. 135 In DeRusse v. State,136 however, the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals rejected a similar distinction in denying enforcement of a

withdrawn plea proposal. 137 The DeRusse court refused to enforce the

withdrawn plea proposal because defendant had no right to demand
that the prosecutor enter into a plea bargain1 38 and because defendant

was in the same position as if no agreement had been made since the
withdrawal occurred prior to entry of a guilty plea.139 The reasoning of
the Cooper court, therefore, must be regarded as a distinction without a

difference because a prosecutor's withdrawal of a plea proposal, in the
absence of detrimental reliance, leaves a defendant in the same objec-

tive position as if no plea proposal had been made.
The Cooper court also failed to properly assess the character and

effect of the government's conduct, as required by the Supreme Court's
two-step due process analysis. 140 The court of appeals merely characterized the government's withdrawal of the plea proposal as unfair. 14 '
Although one can certainly empathize with the defendant in Cooper in
viewing the prosecutor's actions as unfair, it is questionable whether
133. 429 U.S. 545 (1976).
134. Id. at 560-61 ("['lhere is no constitutional right to plea bargain; the prosecutor need not

do so if he prefers to go to trial."); accord, State v. Jackson, 223 Kan. 554, 575 P.2d 536 (1978) (no
constitutional right to a plea offer even if co-defendant extended an offer); People v. Venable, 46
A.D.2d 73, 361 N.Y.S.2d 398 (1974), aj'd,37 N.Y.2d 100, 371 N.Y.S.2d 471 (1975) (no constitutional duty or right in regard to existence of plea bargaining); Williams v. State, 491 S.W.2d 862
(Tenn. 1973) (no obligation to offer benefit to defendant in exchange for guilty plea); Morano v.
State, 572 S.W.2d 550 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) (statute sanctioning plea bargaining gives defendant
no right to plea bargain).
135. 594 F.2d at 19-20. It had been argued in Weatherford that defendant had been unconstitutionally deprived of opportunity to engage in plea negotiations. 429 U.S. at 560-61. The Cooper
court reasoned that once plea negotiations commence, however, the prosecution must conduct
negotiations fairly. 594 F.2d at 20.
136. 579 S.W.2d 224 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
137. Id. at 236. See also State v. Collins, 44 N.C. App. 141, 260 S.E.2d 650 (1979) (expressly
rejecting Cooper).

138. Id.; see Morano v. State, 570 S.W.2d 550 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978). See also State v. Collins, 44 N.C. App. 141, 145, 260 S.E.2d 650, 653 (1979) (citing Weatherford).
139. 579 S.W.2d at 236. See also State v. Collins, 44 N.C. App. 141,260 S.E.2d 650 (1979) (no
detrimental reliance).
140. See text accompanying notes 75-89 supra.
141. 594 F.2d at 17.
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such conduct rises to the level of a constitutional violation.142 The
prosecutor's withdrawal of the plea proposal fell within his broad discretionary authority, 143 which strongly supports a finding that the prosecutor's action did not constitute misconduct,,' and that defendant
suffered no prejudice through detrimental reliance on the withdrawn
plea proposal. 45 While the Cooper court expressly limited the prosecutor's discretionary power to withdraw a plea proposal, it did not adequately explain why this discretion should be limited when a defendant
has suffered no prejudice through reliance on the plea proposal. 146 Instead, the court obscured this issue by characterizing detrimental reliance as a contract concept that should be rejected as too narrow to
define appropriate relief.14 7 This characterization fails to perceive the
fundamental role that detrimental reliance plays in providing the basis
for a finding that a defendant suffered prejudice, as a result of the prosecutor's withdrawal of the plea proposal, 48 sufficient to restrict a prosecutor's traditionally broad discretion in deciding whether to enter and
fulfill a plea agreement. 149 The Cooper court conceded the lack of detrimental reliance by defendant but held that such a showing was unnecessary to provide relief under due process principles.' 50 It must be
concluded, therefore, that the court rejected prejudice to a defendant as
a requirement of a substantive due process claim when a prosecutor
withdraws a plea proposal that a defendant desires to accept. The
Cooper court's failure to address specifically the question why
prejudice is unnecessary, outside of the court's focus on the prosecutor's obligation of fairness, raises a substantial ground for questioning
the court's finding of a due process violation because prejudice has traditionally been required, either implicitly or explicitly, to trigger the
142. See authorities cited note 55 supra.

143. See text accompanying notes 96-107 supra.
144. See, e.g., People v. Heiler, 79 Mich. App. 714, 262 N.W.2d 890 (1977). See also Bullock
v. State, 397 N.E.2d 310 (Ind. App. 1979) (court refused to exercise "chancellor's foot" veto over
executive branch in absence of a violation of defendant's rights; dissent argued Cooper should

control).
145. See text accompanying notes 39-54 supra.
146. The Cooper court merely stated that it hesitated to give judicial approval to a practice
with possibilities for abuse even though there was no suggestion of deliberate abuse in Cooper.
594 F.2d at 20.
147. Id. at 15-18; see text accompanying notes 22-26 supra.
148. See authorities cited notes 39-55 supra.
149. See, e.g., Bullock v. State, 397 N.E.2d 310 (Ind. App. 1979); People v. Heiler, 79 Mich.
App. 714, 262 N.W.2d 890 (1977).
150. 594 F.2d at 18 (right to enforcement may arise "on the basis alone" of defendant's expec-

tations of fulfillment).
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right to substantive due process relief.15 ' Moreover, the cases that have

applied contract analogies in determining whether to enforce a withdrawn plea proposal, although admittedly not based on constitutional
considerations, are consistent with this principle of due process in that
prejudice, through detrimental reliance on a breached plea agreement,
broad discretionary
is required to support restriction of a prosecutor's
52
authority to withdraw a plea proposal.'
In further justifying enforcement of the withdrawn plea proposal
in Cooper, the court of appeals utilized the sixth amendment right to
the effective assistance of counsel in a dubious manner. The court

pointed out that Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 1l(e)(1), which
requires prosecutors to conduct plea negotiations through defense
counsel, 53 necessarily results in defense counsel communicating the
prosecutor's proposals to the defendant.' 5 4 Because of defense counsel's intervention in plea negotiations, the court expressed concern that

a defendant's confidence in his attorney's integrity and capability might
be jeopardized by the prosecutor's withdrawal of a previously commu-

nicated plea proposal.'55 In support of these contentions, the court relied upon the observation of Mr. Justice Stevens, concurring in Brewer

v. Williams, 56 that "if, in the long run, we are seriously concerned
about the individual's effective representation by counsel, the State
would
cannot be permitted to dishonor its promise [that interrogation
' 57
not take place in counsel's absence] to [defendant's] lawyer.'

Utilization of the effective assistance of counsel principle to justify
enforcement of the withdrawn plea proposal in Cooper, however, is
questionable. Two inquiries are involved here-whether an accused is
151. See text accompanying notes 102-07 supra.
152. See text accompanying notes 39-54 supra.
153. FED. R. CRIM. P. 1 (e)(1).
154. 594 F.2d at 18.
155. Id. at 18-19. At the very least, said the court, these sixth amendment considerations
create a greater prosecutorial obligation to negotiate with fairness in seeking guilty pleas. The
court saw evidence of such a loss of confidence in Cooper because the attorney involved in plea
negotiations had been replaced prior to trial. Id. at 19 n.9.
156. 430 U.S. 387 (1977). In Brewer, defense counsel and the police agreed that defendant
would not be interrogated while being transported in the absence of counsel. Nevertheless, the
police did prompt defendant to disclose incriminating information. The majority held that defendant had been improperly interrogated without having waived his right to the presence of
counsel, thus requiring exclusion of defendant's tainted confession. Id. at 404-06.
157. Id. at 415 (Stevens, J., concurring). Mr. Justice Stevens noted that defense counsel fulfills
the role of intermediary between the government and the accused in criminal proceedings: "At
this stage [of criminal proceedings]-as in countless others in which the law profoundly affects the
life of an individual--the lawyer is the essential medium through which the demands and commitments of the sovereign are communicated to the citizen." Id.; see 594 F.2d at 18-19. The majority
opinion, however, made no direct reference to such a consideration.
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entitled to the intervention and advice of counsel during the plea negotiation process1 - 8 and whether counsel's involvement in plea. negotiations constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. 159 The Cooper court
confused these inquiries in that it utilized Brewer-a precedent supporting the first inquiry-to support its finding on the second inquiry
that defendant had been denied effective assistance of counsel. 160 The
question whether a defendant is entitled to the presence of counsel during particular stages of criminal proceedings, such as plea negotiations,
is clearly distinct from the question whether a defendant is denied effective assistance of counsel when counsel is present and rendering advice.1 6 1 When counsel is involved in the proceedings, the applicable
standard is an objective one based on the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases 162 or whether counsel's assistance constituted a "farce or mockery of justice."' 63 In Cooper, there is
no indication that defense counsel's advice fell short of the objective
standard of reasonable competence." 6 Rather than judge the competence of counsel's advice under this objective standard, which carries a
heavy burden of proof, 65 the Cooper court assessed counsel's competence in the plea negotiations in the context of defendant's subjective
perception of his attorney's capabilities after defendant had been informed that the plea proposal had been withdrawn. 66 This is a novel
approach and a difficult one to apply should a number of other disappointments suffered by a defendant during the criminal process be
transformed into a finding of ineffective assistance through the defendant's perception of defense counsel's capabilities. A subjective standard measured by a defendant's perception of his attorney's
158. See text accompanying notes 112-15 supra.
159. See text accompanying notes 116-20 supra.
160. 594 F.2d at 18. In Brewer,the Supreme Court held only that defendant had a right to the
presence of counsel during interrogation, which had not been voluntarily and intelligently waived.
430 U.S. at 401. The Cooper court's quotation from the concurring opinion of Justice Stevens in
Brewer, see text accompanying note 157 supra, therefore, must be regarded as one taken out of

context.
The Cooper court also cited Anderson v. North Carolina, 221 F. Supp. 930 (W.D.N.C. 1963),
in support of its finding of ineffective assistance of counsel. 594 F.2d at 18. The Anderson court,
however, held only that an accused is entitled to the presence of counsel during plea negotiations
unless that right is waived. 221 F. Supp. at 934-35. Like Brewer, therefore, Anderson must be
regarded as support for the first, rather than the second, inquiry.
161. See text accompanying notes 109-120 supra.
162. See text accompanying note 109 supra.
163. See note 110 supra.
164. The Fourth Circuit has adopted the "reasonable competence" standard. See, e.g., Marzullo v. Maryland, 561 F.2d 540 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied 435 U.S. 1011 (1978).
165. Id. at 544.
166. 594 F.2d at 19, n.9.
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capabilities, particularly when that perception arises out of circumstances beyond counsel's control, is not doctrinally sound.16 1 In addition, it is hard to understand how the failure of defense counsel to
obtain a plea bargain' 6 8 can be utilized to support an ineffective assistance of counsel claim when defendants are not constitutionally entitled to plea bargain. 16 9 The Cooper court's use of the right to effective

assistance of counsel to support its enforcement of a withdrawn plea
proposal, therefore, is even more unfounded than its application of the
right to due process.

A further basis for questioning the holding in Cooper is the failure
of the court of appeals to explain why it disagreed with the rationale of
167. See, e.g., United States v. Beaver, 524 F.2d 963, 965 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S.
905 (1976) ("[W]e cannot hold that mere subjective lack of confidence in the attorney by a defendant is sufficient to render the assistance provided by counsel ineffective ....
"); Vf United States
v. Mancusi, 275 F. Supp. 508, 517 (E.D.N.Y. 1967) ("Certainly, no procedure can prevent many
defendants from believing that they were unfairly treated. Whatever the circumstances, many of
them, brooding in their cells, will ultimately be convinced of their own purity and the impropriety
of society in dealing with them.").
168. Defendant's damaged perception of his attorney's capabilities necessarily flows from
counsel's failure to secure the prosecutor's plea proposal.
169. See, e.g., Crow v. Coiner, 323 F. Supp. 555 (N.D. W. Va. 1971) (failure of defendant to
get "best deal" not evidence of ineffective assistance of counsel); text accompanying notes 133-35
supra. A further question is presented by the court's failure to address the view that advice to
engage in plea bargaining may not be in the defendant's best interests. For example, the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas, in UnitedStates v. Grffln, stated:
It is the Court's opinion, probably a minority opinion, that the process of negotiating
pleas has a tendency to demean all participants: the attorneys, the defendant, and even
the Court ...
Perhaps only trial judges fully understand the pervasiveness of the "fear of trial" experienced
by even excellent attorneys. Although good lawyers will not permit this fear to rise to the level of
a conscious factor in plea negotiations, it must often remain subconsciously at work in the process,
encouraging acceptance of a negotiated plea on some basis other than the merits ....
[Tihere must be more than a lingering concern, when a negotiated plea is heard, that an
innocent defendant has been prevailed upon, or has chosen to "play the odds," rather than to
staunchly maintain his innocence.
United States v. Griffin, 462 F. Supp. 928, 930-32 (E.D. Ark. 1978). This sentiment finds strong
support in Professor Alschuler's excellent discussion.of the plea bargaining process:
[Tihe plea bargaining system is an inherently irrational method of administering justice
and necessarily destructive of sound attorney-client relationships. This system subjects
defense attorneys to serious temptations to disregard their client's interests-temptations
so strong that the invocation of professional ideals cannot begin to answer the problems
that emerge. Today's guilty plea system leads even able, conscientious and highly motivated attorneys to make decisions that are not really in their clients' interest.
Defense Attorney's Role, supra note 124, at 1180.
In Cooper, defendant was confronted with strong incriminating evidence in the form of a
properly admitted recording of the third telephone call to Simpson and Simpson's testimony. See
note 12 supra. Therefore, even had Cooper entered a guilty plea to the original charges, he probably could not have attacked defense counsel's advice as ineffective. See, e.g., Tollett v. Henderson,
411 U.S. 258 (1973) (advice to enter plea effective even though grand jury selection procedures
open to successful challenge); McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970) (advice to enter plea
effective even though defendant's confession probably inadmissible in evidence). See also United
States v. Thomas, 470 F. Supp. 968 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
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Heiler and Shields. 7 ' The Heifer/Shields approach refuses to enforce
a withdrawn plea proposal in the absence of prejudice to a defendant
through detrimental reliance, judicial acceptance of the plea agreement, or entry of a guilty plea. 7 ' Although the court of appeals in
Cooper recognized Heiler and Shields, it failed to explain adequately

its rejection of these cases. 172 The only factual distinction that can be

made between Heiler and Shields, on the one hand, and Cooper, on the

other, is the unfavorable one that the former cases did offer a contractual basis for enforcement in that each defendant had accepted the

prosecutor's plea proposal, whereas, in the latter case, a traditional contract had not been formed because the defendant had not communi-

cated his acceptance of the plea proposal prior to the prosecutor's
withdrawal. 73 Heiler rests upon the principle that no reasonable expectation of benefit can arise from a plea proposal, and thus that a

defendant can suffer no prejudice as a result of withdrawal of the proposal, until the trial court accepts the agreement because that accep-

tance is a condition precedent to all plea arrangements. 74 In the federal courts, trial court acceptance is also a condition precedent to all
plea arrangements.175 Shields viewed defendant's entry of a guilty plea
170. See text accompanying notes 55-69 supra.
171. Id. The Heiler court explained that, absent prejudice to the defendant resulting from the
prosecutor's withdrawal from an agreement, judicial enforcement of a proposal would intrude on
the power of the executive branch of government, thereby violating the constitutional separation
of powers principle. 79 Mich. App. at 720-21, 262 N.W.2d at 895.
172. 594 F.2d at 19 n.10.
173. In Cooper, the proposal had been offered to defendant and subsequently withdrawn
within approximately a four hour period. See text accompanying notes 13-16 supra. In Heiler,
the plea proposal had been offered, accepted and withdrawn within a period of approximately
forty-eight hours. 79 Mich. App. at 717-18, 262 N.W.2d at 892. In Shields, the proposal had been
withdrawn several weeks after acceptance by defendant. 374 A.2d at 818. In both Heiler and
Shields defense counsel played an integral role in advising the defendant and communicating
with the prosecutor. See notes 59 & 67 supra.
In a footnote, the Cooper court recognized that the absence not only of detrimentail reliance
but also a traditional contract took it "not one but two steps beyond" the Fourth Circuit's earlier
cases, 594 F.2d at 17 n.6, which, like Heiler and Shields, had required both a contractual basis and
detrimental reliance for enforcement of a withdrawn plea proposal, see, e.g., United States v.
Carter, 454 F.2d 426 (4th Cir. 1972).
174. See text accompanying notes 56-71 supra.
175. In the federal courts any plea agreement can be rejected by the trial judge if the defendant is given an opportunity to withdraw his plea of guilty. FED. R. CtUM. P. ll(e)(4). See, e.g.,
United States v. Stamey, 569 F.2d 805 (4th Cir. 1978). If the proposal had not been withdrawn in
Cooper but had later been rejected by the district court, Cooper would have been permitted to
withdraw his guilty plea and could not have been heard to complain. See, e.g., United States v.
Wagner, 529 F.2d 518 (4th Cir. 1976). Because any agreement can be rejected, judicial acceptance
is an implied condition precedent to all plea agreements in the federal courts. One must question
why enforcement is necessary if the defendant can be placed in the same position he would have
been in had the trial judge refused to accept the agreement. In DeRusse v. State, 579 S.W.2d 224,
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as the point in time at which a plea proposal becomes binding upon the
prosecutor. 176 In Cooper, no guilty plea had been entered. Although
both Heiler and Shields recognized exceptions when a defendant could

show prejudice through some form of detrimental reliance upon the
agreement, 177 the court of appeals in Cooper viewed the lack of reliance
as having no consequence.' 78 The Cooper court's failure to explain this
rejection of Heiler and Shields, however, must be viewed as a fundamental shortcoming because the Heiler/Shields approach offers a well-

reasoned means for balancing the prosecutor's discretionary powers
with defendant's rights by requiring a showing of prejudice to defend79
ant as a predicate to enforcement of a withdrawn plea proposal. 1
The Cooper court's dubious use of the rights to
due process and
effective assistance of counsel to support its enforcement of a with-

drawn plea proposal, and the court's failure to explain its rejection of
the Heiler/Shields approach, 8 0 make adoption of the Cooper decision

by other jurisdictions highly unlikely."" It remains, however, the controlling authority in the Fourth Circuit. The question arises, therefore,
of what effect Cooper may have on future plea bargaining practices.
An important limitation of Cooper specified by the court of appeals itself is that the prosecutor's office can condition any or all plea
proposals on a superior's approval of the agreement. 82 This would
avoid the problem presented in Cooper of a prosecutor improperly
"second-guessing" a subordinate's judgment. 83 The Cooper court apparently felt that a defendant's expectations are not injured when a
proposal containing such a reservation is withdrawn prior to entry of a
236 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979), the court utilized this reasoning to deny enforcement of a plea propo.
sal. The court stated: "[Defendant] was in the same position he would have been in had no agreement been made, or had the trial court indicated that it would not follow the agreement and
[defendant] withdrawn his plea." Id. In DeRusse, the prosecution withdrew from the agreement
just prior to defendant's entry of a guilty plea, but the court held that any prejudice had been
cured by giving defendant a two-month continuance to prepare for trial. Id.
176. See text accompanying note 69 supra.
177. See text accompanying notes 62 & 69 supra.
178. 594 F.2d at 16-17.
179. The Supreme Court of Iowa, in State v. Edwards, 279 N.W.2d 9 (Iowa 1979), expressly
rejected Cooper, in favor of the Hel/er/Shields approach. In Edwards, the court held that the
unilateral withdrawl of a plea proposal by the prosecutor's office in the absence of a guilty plea or
some other detrimental reliance by the defendant, provided no legal basis for enforcement of the
plea proposal. Id. at 12. In rejecting Cooper, the Edwards court explained that "we do not believe
Santobello may logically be extended to control a situation in which defendant has neither pled
guilty nor detrimentally relied on a plea arrangement." Id. at 11-12.
180. See text accompanying notes 121-70 supra.
181. See, e.g., State v. Edwards, 279 N.W.2d 9 (Iowa 1979); State v. Collins, 44 N.C. App. 141,
260 S.E.2d 650 (1979).
182. 594 F.2d at 20.
183. See text accompanying note 21 supra.
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guilty plea or performance of other acts in reliance on the agreement
because the defendant is aware that the prosecutor's superior may not
approve the agreement. It is difficult to understand, however, why reservation of a condition should be the dividing line between "fairness"
and "unfairness." A defendant's expectations that the agreement will
be fulfilled, which Cooper purportedly protects under appropriate circumstances, 184 are raised substantially regardless of whether the proposal is conditioned upon a superior's approval because a defendant
probably believes that the proposal would not have been made were it
not the superior's policy to approve such proposals. Moreover, it is
hard to distinguish the condition precedent of a. superior's approval
from the condition precedent of judicial acceptance that the Cooper
court implicitly rejected as a bar to enforcement of a withdrawn plea
proposal.' 8 5 Finally, if conditioning a plea proposal on a superior's approval is sufficient to avoid Cooper, its ambitious holding will be
drained of any practical effect as prosecutors perfunctorily insert such
reservations in all plea proposals.
A second important limitation of the Cooper decision is the court's
suggestion that "extenuating circumstances," which were absent in
Cooper, could justify the government's withdrawal of a plea proposal.' 8 6 Although the court did not attempt to describe these circumstances, choosing instead to leave development to a case-by-case
evolution, 8 7 existing case law provides some indication of the type of
''extenuating circumstances" that might justify withdrawal of a plea
proposal. Circumstances that do not appear sufficiently extenuating to
justify the government's withdrawal include dissatisfaction with the
disposition by a defendant's victims,' 88 a defendant's receipt of a more
lenient sentence from the judge than had been contemplated by the
agreement, 189 the judge's admonition to the defendant that the court is
not bound by the prosecutor's sentencing recommendation, 90 employment of a defendant by the person against whom he had agreed to tes184. See text accompanying notes 19-33 supra.
185. The conclusion that the Cooper court rejected the condition precedent ofjudicial acceptance as a bar to enforcement of a withdrawn plea proposal follows implicitly from its rejection of
the Heller decision, which denied enforcement of a withdrawn plea proposal expressly because a
defendant could form no reasonable expectations of benefit from a plea proposal prior to the trial
court acceptance that is a condition precedent of all binding plea arrangements. See text accompanying notes 174-79 supra.
186. 594 F.2d at 19; see text accompanying note 21 supra.
187. 594 F.2d at 18.
188. See State v. Tourtellotte, 88 Wash. 2d 579, 564 P.2d 799 (1977).
189. See State v. Lordan, 116 N.H. 479, 363 A.2d 201 (1976).
190. See State v. Weig, 285 N.W.2d 19 (Iowa 1979).

626

NORTH CAROLINA LAW.REVIEW

[Vol. 58

tify,19 ' a defendant's request for an attorney when the police demand
92
information that the defendant has agreed to provide at a later time,1
entry of a guilty plea by the person against whom a defendant has
agreed to testify, 93 unfamiliarity of the prosecutor with all material in
a defendant's investigation file at the time the bargain was made,194 the
prosecutor's discovery of a defendant's prior, unfavorable parole history, 95 and the victim's death, after entry of a guilty plea to bargained
charges, from injuries caused by a defendant. 196 Circumstances that
appear to be sufficiently extenuating to justify the prosecutor's withdrawal from the plea agreement include a defendant's involvement in
criminal activity after the agreement has been entered into, 197 a defendant's failure to provide promised information' 9 8 or testify against another as agreed, 99 a defendant's repudiation of the agreement, 20 0 a
defendant's appeal of his guilty plea conviction resulting in vacatur of
the plea,2 1 a defendant's request for a reduction in sentence after the
original sentence is imposed pursuant to the plea agreement, 20 2 a de191. See State v. Johnson, 25 Wash. App. 490, 596 P.2d 308 (1979).
192. See id. (defendant entitled to reasonable time under reasonable conditions to fulfill bar-

gain).
193. See State v. Neitte, 363 So. 2d 425 (La. 1978).
194. See State v. Lord, 109 N.J. Super. 80, 262 A.2d 244 (1970).
195. See In re Palodichuk, 22 Wash. App. 107, 589 P.2d 269 (1978). But see People v. Cummings, 84 Mich. App. 509, 269 N.W.2d 658 (1978) (defense counsel concealed defendant's prior
record during plea negotiations).
196. See State v. Thomas, 61 N.J. 314, 320-21, 294 A.2d 57, 60 (1972) (prosecutor should have
known of victim's critical condition).
197. See State v. Williams, 122 Ariz. 146, 593 P.2d 896 (1979) (defendant assaulted wife and
mother-in-law during probation); Green v. United States, 377 A.2d 1132 (D.C. App. 1977) (defendant subsequently arrested on narcotics charges); State v. Pascall, 49 Ohio App. 2d 18, 358
N.E.2d 1368 (1972) (defendant convicted for armed robbery after entering plea bargain); State v.
Giebler, 22 Wash. App. 640, 591 P.2d 465 (1979) (change in sentence recommendation justified
when defendant assaulted fellow prisoner); State v. Yates, 13 Wash. App. 116, 533 P.2d 846 (1975)
(defendant fled state while on release from jail for medical evaluation).
198. See, e.g., United States v. Boulier, 359 F. Supp. 165 (E.D.N.Y. 1972), aj'd sub twin.
United States v. Nathan, 476 F.2d 456 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,414 U.S. 823 (1973). See also United
States v. Simmons, 537 F.2d 1260 (4th Cir. 1976) (evidentiary hearing prior to prosecutor's withdrawal required).
199. See, e.g., United States v. Simmons, 537 F.2d 1260 (4th Cir. 1976); Brown v. State, 367
So. 2d 616 (Fla. 1979). But see Franklin v. State, 94 Nev. 220, 577 P.2d 860 (1978) (holding
bargain open until defendant gives testimony violates public policy).
200. See, e.g., Cardillo v. United States, 476 F.2d 631 (5th Cir. 1973) (per curiam); f Hutto
v. Ross, 429 U.S. 28 (1976) (per curiam) (confession given subsequent to negotiated plea agreement from which defendant withdrew not involuntarily given).
201. See, e-g., Sweetwine v. State, 42 Md. App. 1, 398 A.2d 1262 (1979) (prosecutor and defendant return to "square one," entitling prosecutor to reinstate charges dismissed pursuant to
bargain that had secured initial guilty plea). But see People v. McMiller, 389 Mich. 425, 208
N.W.2d 451 (1973).
202. See, eg., Van Meveren v. District Court, 575 P.2d 4 (Colo. 1978). But see State v. Spinks,
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fendant's pursuit of habeas corpus proceedings," 3 and a trial court's
rejection of a plea agreement or a defendant's guilty plea. 20 4 Judging
from the existing decisional law delineating the limits of "extenuating
circumstances," this exception to the holding of the court in Cooper,
unlike that of conditioning the agreement on a superior's approval,
must be considered a reasonable and necessary safety valve for the equitable administration of justice that does not thwart the broader purposes of the Cooper decision.
The Cooper court's recognition of a constitutional right to enforcement of a favorable plea proposal withdrawn, in the absence of "extenuating circumstances," because of a "superior's second-guessing of a
by a questionable analysis that
subordinate's judgment '2°5 is supported
minimizes its precedential value.20 6 The court's utilization of the
Supreme Court's decision in Santobello to support defendant's constitutional right to "fairness" in the plea negotiation process merely begs
the question of why the prosecutor's withdrawal of the plea proposal
violated defendant's constitutional rights because identifying a right to
fairness means only that there is a right to be free from governmental
misconduct in violation of a protected right of the defendant. One
must discern, therefore, a more specific protected right on the part of
the defendant to support use of substantive due process principles.
Closer scrutiny reveals the only possible protected right to be one arising from the defendant's expectations that his case will be settled
through a favorable plea bargain once the prosecutor offers an acceptable proposal. By protecting these expectations in the absence of detrimental reliance, the Cooper court recognizes a constitutional right of a
defendant to expect ultimate disposition of his case through a plea arrangement. Constitutional protection for a defendant's plea bargain
expectations conflicts, however, with the principle that defendants are
not constitutionally entitled to plea bargain.20 7 The Cooper court distinguished this principle as inapplicable to a situation in which the
prosecutor has commenced plea negotiations. Such a distinction is
questionable, however, when a defendant suffers no prejudice through
66 N.J. 568, 334 A.2d 23 (1975) (appellate review of excessive sentence imposed pursuant to bar-

gain does not justify prosecutor's rejection of bargain).
203. See, e.g., Doran v. Wilson, 369 F.2d 505 (9th Cir. 1966).
204. See, e.g., United States v. Thalman, 457 F. Supp. 307 (E.D. Wis. 1978).
205. 594 F.2d at 19; see text accompanying note 21 supra.
206. See, e.g., State v. Edwards, 279 N.W.2d 9 (Iowa 1979). See also State v. Collins, 44 N.C.
App. 141, 260 S.E.2d 650 (1979).
207. See, e.g., Weatherford v. Bursery, 429 U.S. 545, 561 (1977).
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detrimental reliance on the plea proposal because that defendant remains in the same objective position as if no plea proposal had been
made. 20 8 Utilization of the right to effective assistance of counsel is
insufficient to make up for the shortcomings of the Cooper court's due
process analysis because that doctrine bears, at best, only a tenuous
relationship to the situation presented in Cooper. The Heler/Shields
approach, denying enforcement to withdrawn plea proposals in the absence of detrimental reliance, offers a well-reasoned basis for balancing
defendant's rights with the prosecutor's broad discretionary powers.
The Cooper court's failure to explain why it disagreed with the
Heiler/Shieldsapproach, aside from the apparent difference in opinion
as to whether relief is appropriate, creates a further basis for questioning the court's holding. Because relief in Cooper was not premised on
the prejudice suffered by a defendant through reliance on a withdrawn
plea proposal, it must be concluded that the Fourth Circuit has adopted
the "novel argument" that a defendant's constitutional rights are violated by being tried.20 9
LAWRENCE

K.

RYNNING

208. See, e.g., DeRusse v. State, 579 S.W.2d 224, 236 (rex. Crim. App. 1979).
209. The United States Supreme Court, in Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545 (1977), stated
that "there is no constitutional right to plea bargain; the prosecutor need not do so if he prefers to
go to trial. It is a novel argument that constitutional rights are infringed by trying the defendant
rather than accepting his plea of guilty." Id. at 561.

